The following morning, Agent Torres returned to the precinct with authorization to review the relevant records alongside Detective Miller and the designated system specialist.
This time, Commander Hale met her at the entrance himself.
"Good morning, Agent Torres."
"Good morning, Commander."
"I've arranged a private room and confirmed that the personnel handling the audit are authorized to access the material. We won't repeat yesterday's confusion."
Torres gave a brief nod.
"Thank you. The more carefully we preserve the record, the easier it will be to establish what happened."
They walked to the conference room, where Miller and the system specialist were already waiting. The specialist, a patient technician named Laura Kim, had prepared a report showing the access history of the affected evidence entries.
Kim explained that the records system stored several kinds of information: the user account associated with an action, the time of access, the workstation or session identifier when available, and the history of changes made to an entry.
"Some of the earlier records are straightforward," Kim said. "Routine access by assigned personnel. But these four entries have unusual amendment histories."
She displayed the first record.
A transfer time had been changed, but the system retained the earlier value in the audit history. The second record contained an added authorization field that did not appear in the original archive. The third had been reopened after it was marked complete.
The fourth record was different.
It showed an evidence review that, according to the paper file, had never taken place.
Miller frowned.
"That review was never scheduled."
"Correct," Kim said. "The electronic record indicates that it occurred, but I couldn't find a corresponding appointment, signed review sheet, or authorized request."
Torres leaned forward.
"Does the system identify the person who entered it?"
"The entry was saved under a shared supervisory account. We can establish when it was created, but the session data is incomplete. I need the authorized technical team to determine whether other logs can identify the workstation or user session."
"Please preserve the current copy and the audit history before doing anything else," Torres said. "We need an unaltered record of what the system shows now."
Kim confirmed that the preservation procedure had already been initiated.
Hale looked troubled.
"If the review never happened, why create a record claiming it did?"
"There are several possibilities," Torres replied. "Someone could have entered the wrong information. A record might have been imported incorrectly. Or someone might have wanted the system to show that a review took place when it didn't. We need evidence before deciding which explanation fits."
Miller opened the paper file and checked the dates.
"The evidence was supposed to remain sealed until the review team received formal authorization. If the electronic entry is accurate, someone accessed the record outside the expected schedule."
"Or the entry itself is inaccurate," Torres reminded him. "We need to establish whether the physical evidence was moved, whether anyone accessed the storage area, and whether the documentation was changed before or after the relevant event."
Kim brought up the access history for the secure evidence room. Several entries matched normal staff movements. One entry required further examination because the associated electronic authorization did not align with the time recorded in the paper register.
Hale instructed Miller to preserve the original paper documents and arrange a formal comparison with the electronic system. He also requested that the evidence-room supervisor provide an account of the access procedure, without suggesting that any particular employee was responsible.
The review continued for two hours.
At the end of it, they had established three important facts. First, multiple records had been changed after their original submission. Second, at least one electronic review entry lacked a matching paper record. Third, the available data was insufficient to identify the person who made the changes.
It was concerning, but it was not yet proof of criminal conduct.
Torres summarized the findings in her notes.
"We should treat this as a potential integrity issue. Keep the investigation narrow, preserve all original material, and restrict access to the authorized team. If we discover evidence of deliberate falsification, we can expand the review through the proper process."
Hale agreed.
Before the meeting ended, Miller mentioned the visitor who had asked about Torres the previous afternoon.
"I checked the reception log," he said. "The name he provided didn't match any scheduled appointment. The receptionist remembers that he asked whether you were still in the building."
Torres listened carefully.
"Did he make any direct threat?"
"No."
"Did he try to enter a restricted area?"
"No. He left when the receptionist started checking the appointment system."
"Then we shouldn't treat his behavior as proof of involvement. Preserve the visitor entry and see whether his stated purpose can be verified."
Hale looked at Miller.
"Can we establish whether the name was genuine?"
"We can make the appropriate inquiry, but we'll need to document the basis for it."
"Proceed."
That afternoon, the technical team confirmed that one of the questionable entries had been created through a session associated with a workstation in an administrative area of the precinct. The information did not identify the individual at the keyboard, and the workstation was accessible to more than one authorized employee.
Miller read the report twice.
"So someone inside the building could have made the change."
"That is one possibility," Torres said. "But the session data doesn't establish who used the workstation, whether someone else accessed it remotely, or whether the shared account was used improperly."
Hale rubbed his forehead.
"We have to consider the possibility that the problem is inside our own department."
"We have to consider every possibility that the evidence supports," Torres replied. "That includes an internal issue, a technical error, or activity originating elsewhere. We should not narrow the investigation prematurely."
Hale appreciated the distinction. It was difficult to confront the idea that the department might have a serious record-integrity problem, but it would be worse to allow suspicion to replace evidence.
As the team prepared to leave, Torres received a secure message from her federal supervisor. A related record had been identified in a separate system, and its timestamp appeared to overlap with one of the questionable precinct entries.
She read the message, then looked up.
"Commander, we may have a connection between these discrepancies and the wider federal investigation."
Hale straightened.
"What kind of connection?"
"I'm not ready to draw a conclusion. But we need to compare the records through the authorized channels as soon as possible."
The fake badge incident had exposed a failure in judgment.
The audit was now revealing something more serious: an official record appeared to describe an event that might never have occurred.
Until they could establish who created it and why, the precinct would remain under a cloud of uncertainty.